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The competitive structure of the telecommunication sector is changing all over the 
world. Competition is being introduced in the long-distance segments while the local 
markets remain in general under the control of a (group of) regulated monopolies. This 
paper tries to find the optimal regulation in the monopoly sector and the optimal access 
price, taking into account the effects of the competition between networks, any access 
price plays a role in that it allows the regulator to indirectly control prices in the 
unregulated segment. We show that, there is no loss of generality in making the access 
pcices for originating or terminating a call equal. Moreover, under complete 
information, if networks are poor substitutes, the optimal access price is lower than the 
marginal cost of access. Under asymmetric information, two effects work in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, access price is reduced with respect to marginal cost to 
induce a reduction in final price. On the other hand, access price is increased with 
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Competition in telecommunications is becoming more and more widespread. The 
industry that was considered as a natural monopoly, is now viewed as a multiproduct 
sector where some products (typically the local calls sector) are subject to (large) 
economies of scale, while other products could be competitive. The result is then the 
coexistence within the same firms of a regulated sector and a competitive one. The case 
of Argentina is a good example of this trend. In 1989 the national telecommunications 
monopoly was privatized into two separated (and regulated) regional monopolies. This 
monopoly position was guaranteed for the 10 first years after the privatization
1. In 1999 
competition between the two operators was allowed for long-distance calls. Moreover, 
two new operators entered the market to serve this segment. As a consequence, the two 
incumbents are still regulated for local calls (each of them is still a monopoly) while all 
networks freely compete in linear prices in the long-distance segment. Nevertheless, the 
regulator still has some influence over those prices through the regulation of the access 
price. The objective of this paper is to build a model that could represent this situation 
and to study the optimal regulation of the local segment and of the access price given 
the competition generated in the long-distance segment. 
The model will be developed combining two different aspects of network competition 
in the existing literature. The first is the regulation of a single network under incomplete 
information when it faces competition in some services. This is the approach followed 
by Laffont and Tirole (1997). In their model, a single network, the incumbent, is 
regulated in both local and long-distance calls and a perfectly competitive fringe is 
available for the latter. They determine then the optimal regulation of local, long-
distance calls and access. There are two main differences between their model and the 
one in this paper. On the one hand, they are considering a fully regulated monopoly. 
That is, even if there is competition for the long-distance segment, the incumbent cannot 
freely determine the price it wants to charge for this service
2. On the other hand, there is 
no network competition in their model. The competitive fringe needs access to sell its 
product and then access is only one-way. On the contrary, our model has two networks 
that have to be interconnected to each other and then access is here two-ways. 
The second related model is the one developed by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) and 
(1998b), which assumes two competing and unregulated networks. In their framework 
two different networks compete in the unique product they sell to final consumers. In 
contrast with our model, their objective is to study how network competition will 
actually take place. They marginally investigate what would be the optimal access price 
with complete information. Our model, therefore, goes further in that it introduces a 
second regulated segment and analyzes the optimal regulatory policy under incomplete 
information. 
In this paper we show that, in general, the optimal access price is different from the 
marginal cost of providing access. The reason is that without perfect competition in the 
                                                 
1 Actually, the guarantee was for the 7 first years but with a possible extension of 3 years if some goals 
were achieved. 




long-distance segment, it is optimal to introduce a distortion in the access price in 
order to overcome the distortion generated by the market power of the networks. 
Moreover, with such a policy, the regulator can replicate the second-best policy that 
would have resulted from having a fully regulated monopoly. 
2.  The general setup 
Two networks provide two different kinds of services: local calls (good 0) and long-
distance calls. Each network is a monopoly in the provision of local calls, but both 
compete with each other in the market of long-distance calls (good 1). For the market of 
local calls, consumers are allocated regionally to each network, in such a way that local 
calls are always from one network to itself. For long-distance calls, each network 
provides interior calls (good i) and exterior calls (good e). As a benchmark we will 
consider the case where consumers cannot choose between the two networks for long-
distance calls. We will assume in that case that each network is completely regulated. 
The characteristics of the market are described in what follows. 
Demand structure: We assume that the demands for local and long-distance calls are 
independent of each other. To simplify, we assume a balanced calling pattern. This 
assumption implies that the probability of a call to finish on-net or off-net is equal to the 
market share of the originating or terminating network. Networks are differentiated à la 
Hotelling. There is a continuum of customers with unit mass uniformly distributed on 
the segment [0,1] and each network is located at one of the extremes: network 1 is 
located at x
1 = 0 and network 2, at x
2 = 1
3. For local calls, half of the consumers are 
assigned to each network. Each customer has to pay a transportation cost if he is not 
able to subscribe to his most preferred network. The utility of a customer located at x 






j j x x q u q u q u z y − − + + + + τ α α 1 1 0 0  
where y is the consumer's income, z is the (fixed) utility of being connected to the 
system, α
j is the market share of network j, ul(ql
j) is the utility derived from consuming 
q
j of good l and τ  is the per unit of distance transportation cost. We will assume that 
ul
’ > 0, ul
’’ < 0 and ul
’’’ < 0, l = 0,1
4. All along the paper, it is assumed that z is large 
enough, so that all the consumers are connected to one network. 
Consumers, then, maximize their utility given the prices of all the goods. The 
corresponding indirect utility functions are: 
                                                 
3 It should be stressed that the dimension of differentiation is completely orthogonal to the real 
geographical position of the networks, so the consumer located at x = 0 may belong to network 2 for local 
calls. 
4 In fact, ul
’’’  < 0 is too strong an assumption. For instance, with a constant elasticity utility function with 
demand elasticity equal to η , it is always true that the third derivative is positive. Nevertheless, all the 
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Cost structure: We assume that the marginal cost of the local loop for network j is c0
j. 
The long-distance calls create and additional marginal cost equal to c1 for any network 
which is always paid by the originating network. All technologies exhibit constant 
returns to scale, except for a fixed cost f that has to be incurred for each customer that is 
connected to a network. On the other hand, each network charges an originating access 
charge, ao
j and a terminating access charge at
j, for the completion of calls of clients 
subscribing the other network. 





j. In Figure 1 we show the unit profit for network 1 (located in 
the north for local calls), for a long-distance call according to the region in which it is 
originated and terminated. 
 
 
Figure 1: Unit profit of network 1 
                                                 

































j as a transfer received by the firm from the government, the profit function 
of network j can be written as: 
() [] () ()
() ()
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The first term is the profit made on local calls. The following terms are the profits made 
on long-distance calls originated in network j, which depend on the access charges of 
network  k. Finally, the last three terms are the profits made on access provided to 
network k, which depends on the number of long-distance calls originated in network k. 
It will be useful to rewrite equation (1) as 
() [] ()
() ()
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So the first two terms are the retail profit and the following two are access revenue or 
deficit. 
3.  Regulation of two regional monopolies: A benchmark 
As a benchmark, we assume in this section that there is no competition neither in the 
local segment nor in the long-distance segment. Consumers are obliged to subscribe to 
its local provider for long-distance calls, so α
1 = α
2 = 1 / 2.  Then,  the  consumers' 
indirect utility function and the networks' profit functions write in this framework: 
() ( ) ( )
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π  (2) 
3.1 Complete  information 
We assume first that all the relevant information about the cost structure is available to 
the regulator and that c0
1 = c0
2 = c0. Assuming an utilitarian regulator and a cost of 
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Proposition 1. The optimal pricing is a Ramsey pricing structure. Prices of local calls 
and long-distance calls are symmetric for both networks and given by p0
1 = p0
2 = p0 and 
p1
1 = p1

























where η 0 is the demand elasticity of local calls and η 1 is the demand elasticity of long-
distance calls. 
Proof. The first thing that can be observed is that the only relevant variable is the sum 
of the access charges. Second, social welfare is independent of the access charges. 
Because the access deficit of a network equals the access revenue of the other network, 
access payments are just transfers from one network to the other, and those transfers do 
not create any distortion through the tax system. Therefore, the relevant marginal cost 
for off-net calls is the true marginal cost 2c0 + c1, which is equal to the marginal cost of 
on-net calls. The rest of the proof is standard: the regulator sets (t
1,t
2) such that profits 
are equal to zero and then optimizes with respect to prices. QED. 
Of course, under complete information, if the regulator can control all the prices, and 
given that transfers are costly, the best she can do is to distort the prices over the 
marginal cost proportionally to the inverse of the demand elasticity. The magnitude of 
the distortion increases when the cost of the transfers increases. 
Ramsey prices are the first-best solution and are implementable under complete 
information. 
3.2 Incomplete  information 
Of course, it is well known that the regulator usually is not able to observe the cost 
structure of the regulated firm. In that case, Ramsey prices are no longer implementable 
and, therefore, a second-best solution has to be found. 
So, let us assume now that the regulator cannot observe the cost structure of the 
networks. For simplicity we assume that the regulator observes the long-distance 
marginal cost, c1. However, the local marginal cost c0 is private information of the 
networks. More specifically we assume that it is common knowledge that each 
network's local marginal cost is independently drawn from the same cdf function F(c0
j) 
on the support  [] 0 0,c c = Ω .  
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For the rest of the paper we define  ()
k j k j j c c c c 0 0 0 0 , , ~ , ~ π , the profit of network j when the 
true cost vector is (c0
j,c0
k) but firms announce ()
k j c c 0 0
~ , ~ , and 
()( )
k j k j j k j j c c c c c c 0 0 0 0 0 0 , , , , π π ≡ , the profit when both firms are truthful. 
From the revelation principle we know that the regulator can restrict its attention to 
direct revelation mechanisms in which agents are induced to truthfully reveal their 
private information. Then, we have to add to the maximization problem the incentive 
compatibility constraints. The regulator's problem, then, writes: 
() () ()
() ( ) ()
() 2 , 1   ,   , 0 ,
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The incentive and participation constraints are interim, because network j only knows 
c0
j but not c0
k. 
Proposition 2. Under assumption 1, the optimal regulatory contract offered to both 












































































k + c1. 
Proof. See appendix.  






21. To induce the networks to reveal their marginal cost, 
prices are distorted upwards (quantities are distorted downwards) except if both 
networks are efficient: c0
1 = c0
2 =  0 c . For the local segment, the pricing structure is 
standard under incomplete information: goods are independent, so the existence of a 
second network does not affect the optimal regulation. Because the marginal cost of the 
networks can differ now, the marginal cost of an exterior call could differ from the 
marginal cost of an interior call. Furthermore, because networks are interconnected even 
if network j is efficient (c0
j =  0 c ), if network k is less efficient, then p1
j will be upward 
distorted. The reason is that the number of exterior calls of network j affects the rent 
that has to be given to a more efficient network k. In order to decrease this rent, the 
regulator distorts downward all the quantities produced by network k plus the quantity 
of exterior calls originated in network j.  
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We have ignored here the possibility of collusion between networks. Indeed, one can 
imagine that networks could coordinate their reports to the regulator and jointly 
announce a cost vector different from the true one in order to obtain a higher rent. 
However, as Laffont and Martimort (1998) have shown, the optimal contract is 
collusion-proof when costs are independent and collusion occurs under asymmetric 
information between the networks. This means that this second-best contract satisfies 
the coalition incentive constraints, so networks can never gain by coordinating to 
announce a false cost vector and, therefore, collusion is not an issue in our framework. 
4.  Duopoly: Competition and regulation under complete information 
We will assume in this section that, while the local segment remains monopolized, 
competition between the networks is allowed in the long-distance segment. Each 
consumer will decide to which network he will subscribe for his long-distance calls. We 
will assume also that the regulator will determine only the prices for local calls and the 
access (originating and terminating) prices, while competition between networks will 
determine the prices of long-distance calls. The timing is as follows: 





j} to network j. 
•  Simultaneously both networks accept or reject the contract. 
•  If a network rejects it receives its status-quo utility, which is assumed to be equal to 
0 and independent of the type. 
•  If network j accepts it will set prices for the long-distance segment p1
j. This choice 
is simultaneous if both firms have accepted the contract. 
•  We are looking for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
4.1  The problem of the firm 
Given the regulatory policy Γ
j network j will maximize its profit. Profit of network j is 
defined as in equation (1). 
We define α  by the location of the consumer who is indifferent between both networks 
for long-distance calls: 
() () () α τ τα − − = − 1 1 1 1 1
k j p v p v  
or equivalently: 
() () []
k j p v p v 1 1 1 1 2
1
− + = σ α  (3) 
where σ  = 1 / 2τ  is a measure of the degree of substitutability between the networks. 
So, in a shared market equilibrium, all customers located to the left of α  will connect to 
network 1 and all the others, to network 2, therefore, α
1 = α  and α
2 = 1 – α . 
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Proposition 3. For either ao + at close to 2c0 or σ  small enough, it exists a unique 
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− = η . 
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the one in Laffont et al. (1998a). 









c p . The first difference is that the true marginal cost is replaced by the 
perceived marginal cost, which in per customer terms is equal to  2
2 0 c a a t o c
− + + . The 
second difference is related to σ , the degree of substitutability between the networks. 
An increase in the price of the long-distance calls lowers market share by σ  times sales 
per customer, q1. This decrease in market share lowers firm j's profits in the symmetric 
equilibrium by () 1 2
2
1
0 q c p
c a a t o − + − −  for the customers belonging to network j and 
increases firm j's profits by  1 2
2 0 q
c a a t o − +  for the customers of network k that need access to 
j's local loop. Therefore, the total decrease in profit generated by a decrease in market 
share is given by () ( ) 1 0 1 1 2 q c a a q c p t o − + − − . 
For the rest of the paper, and only to simplify, we will assume a constant elasticity 
demand function both for local and long distance calls. 
() ()









































This allows us to obtain explicit solutions without affecting the qualitative results, 
which remain valid for any utility function satisfying the assumptions of Section 2.  
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4.2  The regulator's problem 
In the first stage, the regulator will choose the contracts that maximize social welfare, 
taking into account the outcome of the competition game. Because the regulator wants 
both networks to accept the contract, it will have to add a participation constraint: the 
firm can always reject the contract and get 0 outside the relationship. This participation 
constraint in the symmetric equilibrium is equal to: 







1 0 0 0 ≥ − − + − − + q c c p f q c p t  (5) 
Using (4), the regulator's problem, thus, writes: 
() () () () π λ 2 1 2 max
*
1 1 0 0
, , , 0 0
+ + − + t p v p v
t a a p t
 (6) 
subject to (5). 
Because of the cost of publics funds, λ , transfers are costly, which implies that the 
participation constraint will be binding at the optimum. 
Proposition 4.  For  σ  small, and constant elasticity demand functions, the optimal 











0 0 2c a a t < +  (8) 
The regulator can fix one of the access charges at the level it wants, because only the 
sum is determined at the optimum. Then, without loss of generality, she can fix ao = at. 
Proof. Condition (7) results immediately by taking the first order conditions in (6) with 
respect to p0 and noting that this variable does not affect the competitive outcome. To 
obtain condition (8), assume σ  = 0 (by continuity, the qualitative results also hold for σ  






























p .Taking the first order conditions with respect to ao gives: 








































By the envelope theorem,  () 1 1 1
1 p q p
v − = ∂
















The first order condition with respect to at gives the same result. Then, only the sum of 
the two access charges is determined and the regulator has one degree of freedom in 
choosing ao and at. QED 
Because the price in the competitive segment decreases with ao (or at), the regulator 
wants to reduce the access charges under the marginal cost of giving access in order to 
induce a reduction in the price of the competitive segment. Moreover, by setting the 
access charges according to equation (9), the regulator is able to obtain the Ramsey 
price for the competitive segment when σ  = 0. In general, the regulator will choose 
ao + at to get the Ramsey structure. This very strong result comes from the fact that 
access charges do not matter from a social point of view by themselves, because they 
create a transfer that does not generate any distortion through the tax system. They only 
matter as long as they can change the final price in the long distance segment. 
5.  Competition and regulation under incomplete information 
In this section we will assume that the marginal cost is private information of each 
network. As in Section 3.2 we assume that the long-distance marginal cost is common 
knowledge and is the same for both networks. On the other hand, the local marginal cost 
c0
j for each network is independently drawn from the same cdf F(c0
j) on the support Ω . 
We consider the same timing as in the previous section. 










~ , ~ ~ c c c = . 
•  Simultaneously both networks accept or reject the mechanism. 
•  If a network rejects it receives its status-quo utility, which is assumed to be equal to 
0 and independent of the type. 
•  If network j accepts, it announces a marginal cost 
j c0
~ . Then, it will set prices for the 
long-distance segment (p1
j). This choice is simultaneous if both firms have accepted 
the contract. 
•  Transfers are implemented according to the mechanism. 
Some comments have to be made with respect to this timing. For instance, if the choice 
of the contract is simultaneous with the competition between networks, then 
competition would occur under asymmetric information: when network j sets its prices 
for long-distance calls, it does not know c0
k. If, on the contrary, the networks were to 
(publicly) choose the contract before they compete in the long-distance market, 
competition would happen under symmetric information. This implies that we cannot 
simply apply the revelation principle, because the revelation of the private information 
will implicitly change the outcome of the competition game. However, because we are 
trying to reproduce the Argentinean situation, we will assume that the regulator  
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commits to reveal any information it acquires. Therefore, we know that firm will 
compete under symmetric information. 
5.1  Competition under symmetric information 
In this first case, the regulator offers  () () () () {} 0 0 0 0 0





j j , a direct revelation 
mechanism, and asks the networks to select the contract before competition starts in the 
long-distance segment. This implies that the networks will compete under complete 
information. In particular, each network will know the other network's local marginal 
cost and, therefore, the access prices it will face. Given the revelation game and the 
information it gets about network k
6, network $j$ will choose p1
j so as to maximize: 
() [] ()
() ()
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The regulator will use the Nash equilibrium of the competition game to determine the 
optimal access prices. 
If we assume that σ  = 0, then, the solution of the competitive game is to price at the 



















The regulator will then choose the best contract given this competition that would be 
generated ex-post. It will then maximize the expected social welfare under the incentive 
compatibility constraints, the rationality constraints and equations (10). 
The Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints are given by: 




































Then, we have the following result. 
Proposition 5.  When  σ  = 0 the optimal regulatory contract, given that competition 
works under complete information between the networks, is given by: 
                                                 
6 Each network knows that the other network is going to tell the truth about its marginal cost because the 
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Once again, only the sum of the two access charges can be determined. Therefore, the 














































Proof. Following the steps of the proof of Proposition 2, the regulator solves: 
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Condition (13) results immediately by pointwise maximization. 
To find condition (14) we maximize with respect to ao
k (or at










































































































Combining (10) with (14) gives the optimal access charges, equation (15). QED  
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According to Proposition 5, the price of the local calls is the same as in the case of 
non-competing networks. This is natural, because as demands for local and long-
distance calls are independent, there is no additional reason to distort the price of local 
calls on top of giving the correct incentives. With respect to the access price, the 
regulator uses now this instrument to implicitly influence the price of long-distance 
calls. We have shown that without loss of generality the regulator can fix the originating 
access price equal to the terminating access price. In that case, according to Section 4.2, 
when networks are poor substitutes the optimal access price is lower than the marginal 
cost. We see now that under asymmetric information, two effects work in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, the access price is reduced with respect to the marginal cost 
of access to induce a reduction in the final price. This is the same effect as under 
complete information. On the other hand, the access price is increased with respect to 
the marginal cost of access to give incentives to reveal information. As usual, the 
distortion involves an increase in prices and a decrease in quantities of the inefficient 
types to reduce the rent of the more efficient ones. When both networks have the least 
possible marginal cost, the access charges (and therefore the retail price in the long-
distance segment) are equal to the case of complete information. Moreover, comparing 
Proposition 2 and Proposition 5 we can observe that the same price structure for the 
long-distance segment can be obtained with regulation of the final prices or regulation 
of the access charges and competition on the final market. Because this is the best result 
the regulator can hope to achieve, we have shown that allowing competition in the long-
distance segment is a way to implement the optimal regulation in the retail price. 
6. Conclusions 
The determination of the access price is now one of the key issues in 
telecommunications. Competition is being introduced in the long-distance segments 
while the local markets remain in general monopolized. A common fear is that networks 
may agree on high access charges in order to actually eliminate competition. Indeed, 
under some conditions, it has been proved that the access price can be an instrument to 
get the monopoly outcome. Therefore, regulation of the access charge is crucial in order 
to guarantee real competition. A common idea among regulators is that the access price 
should be made equal to the marginal cost of providing access. 
The objective of this paper was to obtain a theory of access price regulation when 
competition is possible in the long-distance calls segment. As a general conclusion, we 
have shown that setting the access price equal to the marginal cost of giving access is 
not in general the best regulatory policy, even if the marginal cost is known. 
Indeed, we have shown that when there is no competition between networks, any access 
price is optimal, because the regulator can directly control final prices. The access 
prices do not affect social welfare, because they constitute a transfer from one network 
to the other and this transfer does not create any distortion through the tax system. This 
is true both under complete or incomplete information about the marginal cost of giving 
access. 
On the other hand, when networks compete in the long-distance segment, the access 
price plays a role in that it allows the regulator to indirectly control prices in the 
unregulated segment.  
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First, we showed that, there is no loss of generality in making the access prices for 
originating or terminating a call equal. The only thing that matters is the total access 
charges. Moreover, under complete information, if networks are poor substitutes, the 
optimal access price is lower than the marginal cost of access. This is because by 
lowering the access charge with respect to the marginal cost of access the regulator can 
induce a reduction of the retail price in the long-distance segment and, therefore, 
indirectly obtain the first-best (fully regulated monopoly) solution. 
Under asymmetric information, two effects work in opposite directions to determine the 
optimal access price. On the one hand, access price is reduced with respect to marginal 
cost to induce a reduction in final price. This is the same effect that was found under 
complete information. On the other hand, access price is increased with respect to 
marginal cost to reduce the rent that has to be given-up in order to provide the correct 
incentives to reveal the cost information. Again, the regulator is able to replicate the 
fully regulated monopoly solution through the regulation of the access charges. 
We can conclude, then, that introducing competition in the long-distance segment and 
regulating the access charges is a way of implementing the optimal regulatory policy. 
7. Appendix 
Proof of proposition 2. 
Network j's profit function is: 
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The Bayesian incentive constraints can be written as: 
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By the envelope theorem, this is equivalent to 
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The expected profit is decreasing in the marginal cost. Therefore, we can forget the 
participation constraints for all types except the least efficient one: 
() 2 , 1 , 0 0
0 = ≥ j c E
j
c
kπ  (18) 
() () () () ( ) []
() () ( ) [] () () ()
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Ω
 (19) 
subject to (16), (17) and (18). 
Solving (16) and (18) and replacing in (19) gives 
() () () () ( ) []
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Pointwise maximization with respect to (p0
j,p1
j), j = 1,2 gives the result. QED 
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